Van Hauwaert, S. M., & van Kessel, S. (2017). Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support. *European Journal of Political Research*. early view. [Supplementary materials]

Appendix I: Party family classification

Table I.A: National parties per party family

	party family	country	party
1	**Socialists**	France	PS: Parti Socialiste
		France	PRG: Parti Radical de Gauche
		Germany	SPD - Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
		Greece	PASOK
		Greece	To Potami (The River)
		Greece	Kinima Dimokraton Sosialiston
		Italy	Partito Democratico
		Poland	SLD — Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej
		Poland	Twój Ruch
		Spain	PSOE - Partido Socialista Obrero Español
		Switzerland	Parti socialiste (PS)
		UK	Labour
2	**Liberals**	Germany	FDP - Freie Demokratische Partei
		Italy	Unione Democratici di Centro e Nuovo Centro Destra
		Poland	Nowoczesna PL
		Spain	Ciudadanos
		Spain	UPyD - Unión Progreso y Democracia
		Spain	CiU - Convergència i Unió
		Sweden	Centerpartiet
		Sweden	Folkpartiet liberalerna
		Sweden	Socialdemokraterna
		Switzerland	Libéraux-Radicaux (PLR)
		UK	Liberal Democrat

3	**Christian democrats**	France	MoDeM: Mouvement Démocrate
		Germany	CDU/CSU
		Greece	New Democracy
		Poland	Kristdemokraterna
		Switzerland	Parti démocrate-chrétien (PDC)
		Switzerland	Parti évangélique Suisse (PEV)
4	**Conservatives**	France	UMP: Union pour un mouvement populaire
		France	MPF: Mouvement Pour la France
		Italy	Fratelli d'Italia
		Poland	PO — Platforma Obywatelska
		Spain	PP - Partido Popular
		Sweden	Moderata samlingspartiet
		Switzerland	Parti bourgeois démocratique (PBD)
		UK	Conservative
5	**Right-wing populists**	France	FN: Front National
		Germany	AfD - Alternative für Deutschland
		Italy	Forza Italia
		Italy	Lega Nord
		Poland	PIS — Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
		Poland	Ruch Pawła Kukiza
		Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna
		Switzerland	Union démocratique du centre (UDC)
		UK	UK Independence Party (UKIP)
		UK	British National Party (BNP)
6	**Left-wing populists**	Germany	Die Linke
		Greece	SYRIZA

		Italy	Movimento 5 Stelle
		Spain	Podemos
7	**Other parties**	France	EELV: Europe Écologie – Les Verts
		Germany	NPD - Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
		Germany	Piratenpartei
		Germany	Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
		Greece	Golden Dawn
		Greece	KKE
		Italy	Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà
		Italy	Radicali Italiani
		Poland	PSL — Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe
		Poland	Miljöpartiet de gröna
		Spain	ERC - Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
		Spain	IU - Izquierda Unida
		Sweden	Vänsterpartiet
		Switzerland	Parti Suisse du Travail (PST)
		Switzerland	Parti écologiste Suisse (Les Verts)
		Switzerland	Parti vert'libéral (PVL)
		UK	Green Party
		UK	Scottish National Party
		UK	Plaid Cymru

Note: The original ZEUS classification includes communist parties, socialists, liberals, Christian democrats, conservatives, extreme right and nationalist parties, regionalist parties, environmentalist parties, agricultural parties and 'other' parties. We reduce this classification by harmonising communists, regionalists, environmentalists, agricultural and other parties into the category 'other'. We exclude those individuals who indicated they did not know who they would vote for if there were an election tomorrow (coded as missing). Category 8 includes those individuals who did not know for which party they would vote

Table I.B: Absolute number of party family supporters, per country

	Socialists	Liberals	Christian democrats	Conservatives	Right-wing populists	Left-wing populists	Other parties	don't know	Total
France	317	0	84	311	392	0	171	303	1,578
Germany	341	88	464	0	126	251	337	147	1,754
Greece	132	0	155	0	97	761	445	312	1,902
Italy	330	24	0	48	341	539	161	297	1,740
Poland	96	96	0	495	874	0	44	172	1,777
Spain	272	355	0	300	0	423	239	236	1,825
Sweden	0	473	49	331	468	0	283	258	1,862
Switzerland	285	183	106	77	420	0	232	259	1,562
UK	520	110	0	654	230	0	247	142	1,903
Total	2,293	1,329	858	2,216	2,948	1,974	2,159	2,126	15,903

Table I.C Average populist attitudes per party family, per country

Note: Average values of populist attitudes are portrayed on the X-axes. The vertical red line on each graph represents the country average of populist attitudes.

Appendix II: Question wordings

The economic issue positions index is comprised of the following five statements:
1. Incomes should be made more equal | We need larger income differences as incentives.
2. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves | The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. (reverse coded)
3. People who are unemployed should have to take any job available or lose their unemployment benefits | People who are unemployed should have the right to refuse a job they do not want. (reverse coded)
4. Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas | Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people. (reverse coded)
5. Government should decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits and services | Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on social benefits and services. (reverse coded)

The cultural issue positions index is comprised of the following five statements:
1. A woman has to have children in order to be fulfilled | A woman can be fulfilled through her professional career. (reverse coded)
2. A woman who does not want to have a child should be allowed to have a free and safe abortion | Abortion should not be allowed in any case.
3. Children should be taught to obey authority | Children should be encouraged to have an independent judgment. (reverse coded)
4. People who break the law should get tougher sentence | Tougher sentences do not contribute to reduce criminality. (reverse coded)
5. Homosexual couples should be able to adopt children| Homosexual couples should not be allowed to adopt children under any circumstances.

The subjective deprivation variable is a combination of the following five items:
o On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'Much worse' and 10 means 'Much better', would you say that your own current standard of living is better or worse compared to your parents when they were your age?
o On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'Much worse' and 10 means 'Much better', would you say that the economic situation of your household now is better or worse to how it was 5 years ago?
o On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'Much worse' and 10 means 'Much better', would you say that the economic situation of your household now is better or worse than it was 12 months ago? [
o On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means 'Much worse' and 10 means 'Much better', would you say that over the past year the state of the economy in COUNTRY has become...?
o The living conditions among European countries differ quite a lot today, and we would like to get your personal evaluation. Please use the scale below, where 0 means 'Very bad living conditions' and 10 means 'Very good living conditions'.
 Where on the scale do you place your country?

The political trust variable is a combination of the trust in 1) national parliament, 2) politicians, 3) political parties, 4) the European Union, 5) trade unions, 6) the judicial system, 7) the police / the army, 8) the media, 9) national government, and 10) banks. All answer categories range from 0 (do not trust this institution at all) to 10 (completely trust this institution).

The internal political efficacy variable combines the following three items:
- o I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics [1 = strongly disagree ; 5 agree strongly]
- o I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing the [COUNTRY] [1 = strongly disagree ; 5 agree strongly]
- o I think that I am at least as well-informed about politics and government as most people [1 = strongly disagree ; 5 agree strongly]

The external political efficacy variable combines the following three items:
- o Public officials don't care much what people like me think [1 = strongly disagree ; 5 agree strongly]
- o People like me don't have any say about what government does [1 = strongly disagree ; 5 agree strongly]
- o Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on [1 = strongly disagree ; 5 agree strongly]

The economic prejudice variable draws from the following question: Would you say it is generally bad or good for the COUNTRY's economy that people come to live here from other countries? Please state your answer on this scale where 0 means 'Bad' and 10 means 'Good'.

The cultural prejudice variable draws from the following question: Would you say that the COUNTRY's cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Please state your answer on this scale where 0 means 'Undermined' and 10 means 'Enriched'.

Appendix III: Descriptive statistics

Table III.A: Absolute number of populist and non-populist supporters, per country

	not a populist vote	not a populist vote (%)	populist vote	populist vote (%)	Total
France	1,332	77,26	392	22,74	1,724
Germany	1,584	80,78	377	19,22	1,961
Greece	878	50,58	858	49,42	1,736
Italy	863	49,51	880	50,49	1,743
Poland	955	52,21	874	47,79	1,829
Spain	1,376	76,49	423	23,51	1,799
Sweden	1,292	73,41	468	26,59	1,760
Switzerland	1,367	76,50	420	23,50	1,787
UK	1,650	87,77	230	12,23	1,880
Total	11,265	69,46	4,954	30,54	16,219

Table III.B: Descriptive statistics of populist attitudes, per country

country	N	mean	median	std. dev.	skewness	kurtosis	alpha	min.	max.
France	2027	0.13	0.10	1.01	-0.28	3.06	0.9053	-3.48	1.81
Germany	2108	-0.25	-0.31	0.88	0.20	3.19	0.8765	-3.48	1.81
Greece	2048	0.17	0.09	0.81	-0.08	3.69	0.8245	-3.48	1.81
Italy	2040	0.25	0.25	0.96	-0.40	3.11	0.8808	-3.48	1.81
Poland	2024	0.10	0.09	0.94	-0.54	3.90	0.8712	-3.48	1.81
Spain	2035	0.16	0.18	0.90	-0.34	3.45	0.8639	-3.48	1.81
Sweden	2018	-0.38	-0.52	0.94	0.32	3.32	0.8884	-3.48	1.81
Switzerland	2046	-0.39	-0.43	0.81	0.20	3.87	0.8426	-3.48	1.81
UK	2022	-0.27	-0.31	0.86	0.26	3.10	0.8604	-3.48	1.81
Total	18368	-0.05	-0.08	0.94	-0.06	3.08	0.8753	-3.48	1.81

Table III.C: Descriptive statistics

var name	n	mean	std dev	min	max
gender (0 = male)	18368	0.53	0.50	0	1
age	18368	44.46	14.89	18	95
age squared	18368	2198.23	1370.51	324	9025
education group (1 = less than secondary; 2 = secondary; 3 = university)	18368	2.08	0.74	1	3
income (brackets)	15630	4.81	2.74	1	10
social class (0 = lower class; 6 = upper class)	16864	3.10	1.10	1	6
household size	18079	2.61	1.35	0	15
marital status (1 = never married, civil partnership, legally separated, legally divorced, widowed, 6 = legally married)	18368	3.65	2.22	1	6
subjective domicile (1 = big city; 5 = farm)	18368	2.50	1.17	1	5
economic prejudice (0 = low ; 10 = high)	17364	5.15	2.85	0	10
cultural prejudice (0 = low ; 10 = high)	17293	4.88	2.94	0	10
subjective deprivation*	16471	5.98	2.31	0	100
social trust (0 = low ; 10 = high)	17727	4.25	2.64	0	10
political trust (0 = low ; 100 = high)**	16588	5.42	2.52	0	100
political interest (1 = low ; 5 = high)	18368	2.81	0.90	1	5
internal political efficiacy (0 = low ; 100 = high)***	18368	3.39	0.91	0	100
external political efficiacy (0 = low ; 100 = high)***	18368	3.23	0.84	0	100

partisan affiliation (0 = no)	17044	0.81	0.39	0	1
satisfaction w/ democracy (1 = low ; 11 = high)	17608	5.72	2.62	1	11
dissatisfaction w/ economic policies (0 = low ; 10 = high)	17609	6.14	2.84	0	10
dissatisfaction w/ immigration policies (0 = low ; 10 = high)	17551	7.13	2.57	0	10
culttural left-right	15530	5.06	2.35	0	11.73
economic left-right	16411	6.41	2.31	0	11.34
populist attitudes	18368	-0.05	0.94	-3.48	1.81

Note: * This is the result of a CFA of five separate pocket-book items that indicate subjective relative deprivation (alpha = 0.84 and EV = 2.54); ** This is the result of a CFA of 10 separate survey items that indicate political trust (alpha = 0.91 and EV = 5.17); *** Both internal and external efficacy is the result of a CFA of three separate survey items that indicate efficacy.

Appendix IV: Full model for the populist vote choice models

Table IV.1: Models with socio-demographics only

	model 1a	model 1b
(coefficients)	left-wing populism	right-wing populism
gender	-0.013	-0.346***
	(0.061)	(0.049)
age	-0.003	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.010)
age squared	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
education group	0.081*	-0.265***
	(0.043)	(0.035)
income	-0.038***	-0.017
	(0.014)	(0.011)
social class	-0.209***	-0.028
	(0.035)	(0.025)
household size	-0.008	0.036*
	(0.025)	(0.020)
marital status	0.005	0.019
	(0.016)	(0.013)
subjective domicile	-0.082***	0.094***
	(0.028)	(0.022)
Observations	6,031	11,566
Number of countries	4	8
LR chi2(9)	99.38	162.73
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	-3331.757	-5279.823

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**Table IV.2: Models with political and attitudinal variables**

(coefficients)	model 2a left-wing populism	model 2b right-wing populism	model 3a left-wing populism	model 3b right-wing populism
social class	-0.133***		-0.136***	
	(0.040)		(0.040)	
income	-0.046***		-0.045***	
	(0.016)		(0.016)	
gender		-0.103*		-0.104*
		(0.062)		(0.062)
education groups		-0.187***		-0.186***
		(0.042)		(0.042)
economic prejudice	0.009	0.047***	0.008	0.047***
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)
cultural prejudice	-0.050***	0.178***	-0.049***	0.177***
	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)
subjective deprivation	-0.015	-0.065***	-0.013	-0.064***
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.022)	(0.017)
social trust	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.014)
political trust	-0.096***	-0.015	-0.097***	-0.015
	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)
political interest	0.166***	0.107**	0.162***	0.106**
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.045)
internal political efficacy	-0.108**	-0.017	-0.102**	-0.016
	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.043)
external political efficacy	-0.150***	0.052	-0.155***	0.050
	(0.048)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.040)
partisan affiliation	0.861***	0.905***	0.859***	0.904***
	(0.115)	(0.111)	(0.114)	(0.111)
satisfaction w/ democracy	-0.037**	-0.110***	-0.036**	-0.109***
	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)
dissatisfaction w/ economic policies	-0.010	-0.045***	-0.013	-0.045***
	(0.020)	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.016)
dissatisfaction w/ immigration policies	-0.041**	0.160***	-0.039**	0.159***
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.017)
cultural left-right	-0.123***	0.147***	-0.123***	0.153***
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.015)
economic left-right	-0.150***	0.009	-0.169***	0.010
	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.014)
populist attitudes	0.302***	0.181***	0.023	0.314***
	(0.049)	(0.041)	(0.109)	(0.094)
economic left-right # populist attitudes			0.049***	
			(0.017)	

cultural left-right # populist attitudes				-0.022
				(0.014)
Observations	4,860	9,767	4,860	9,767
Number of countries	4	8	4	8
LR chi2(17)	488.03	1278.01	496.16	1272.60
Prob > chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Log likelihood	-2527.046	-3678.411	-2522.995	-3677.183

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Appendix V: Marginal plots for the interaction terms, with policy preferences as the moderator

Figure V.1 The average marginal effect of populist attitudes on the likelihood to support a left-wing populist party, according to economic policy preferences.

Figure V.1 The average marginal effect of populist attitudes on the likelihood to support a right-wing populist party, according to cultural policy preferences.